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Case No. 20080946-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellant
vs.

Jesse Valdez,
Defendant/ Appellee.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State appeals from a pretrial dismissal of an information charging illegal
possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone and possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the preliminary hearing magistrate erroneously conclude that the
probation agent's testimony — that police officers assisting him in a probation search
told him that the baggie they showed him was found inside a carburetor next to
Defendant's bed —was inadmissible under rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence,
because the agent did not identify which officer made the statement or discovered
the baggie?

Standard of Review.

Interpretation of an evidentiary rule is a legal

determination that is reviewed for correctness, without deference to the lower
court's interpretation. See State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, | 8, 153 P.3d 830;
State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322, If 14,142 P.3d 581, affd, 2008 UT 47,190 P.3d 1255;
State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ^ 10, 32 P.3d 976. See also State v. Graham, 2006
UT 43, If 16 n. 7,143 P.2d 268 (statutory interpretation).
Preservation. The magistrate rejected the prosecutor's argument that the
hearsay statement was reliable and admissible under rule 1102, UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE (R40:16-17; R. 27-19 & 34-31).
2. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the probation officer's other
testimony was insufficient to bind over on drug possession?
Standard of Review. A magistrate's refusal to bind over is a legal determination
that is reviewed for correctness, with "limited deference" accorded the magistrate's
decision. See State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 392, ^f 5, 174 P.3d 654 (citing State v.
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, | 34,137 P.3d 787).
Preservation. The magistrate rejected the prosecutor's argument that the
evidence was sufficient for bindover (R40:16-17; R. 27-19 & 34-31).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
The following constitutional provision and rules are attached in Addendum A:

2

UTAH CONST, art 1 § 12 - Rights of Accused Persons;
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7 - Proceedings Before Magistrate;
UTAH R. EVID. 1102 - Reliable Hearsay in Criminal Preliminary Examinations.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In July 2008, Defendant was charged with illegal possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2008), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (West Supp.
2008) (R. 3-1). The charges were subsequently amended to a second-degree felony
and a class A misdemeanor, respectively, pursuant to section 58-37-8(4)
(enhancement for drug offense committed in drug-free zone) (R. 18; R40: 2).
A preliminary hearing on the amended information was conducted (R. 18;
R40:2). Adult Probation and Parole Agent Kirt Robinson testified that he directed a
probation search of a small shed Defendant used as his residence (R40:3-15). Police
Officers Wolcott and Barker assisted Agent Robinson, as did a canine officer and
dog (R40: 4 & 6). The agent explained that during the search, he stood with
Defendant just outside the shed's front door because the shed was small and
cluttered (R40: 7-8 & 10-12). The agent testified that Officer Wolcott found drug
paraphernalia and a small baggie above Defendant's bed (R40: 7-8). The agent
testified that Officers Wolcott and Barker then searched further and dismantled a
carburetor next to the bed and found a large baggie (R40: 8-15). The agent observed
3

the items immediately after they were discovered and watched Officer Barker fieldtest the contents of both baggies (R40: 8-13). The field tests confirmed that the small
baggie contained methamphetamine residue and the large baggie contained
methamphetamine crystal (id.). Defense counsel did not object during the agent's
testimony.
After the prosecution rested, defense counsel argued that the evidence was
insufficient without Officers Wolcott7s and Barker's testimony because Agent
Robinson was "not actually present um - when the items were actually located in
the shed/' even though the agent saw the drugs being field-tested (R40:15-16). The
prosecutor disagreed. She asserted the testimony established probable cause to
support a bindover, especially where the testifying agent was "present . . . just
outside the door, had seen the location, had seen everything that was involved in it,
and was involved with running the whole search, and was advised by other officers
what had been found in areas that he had seen himself as well" and the agent was
the "officer who made the decision about why and when to make this search" (R40:
16). The prosecutor offered, nevertheless, to move to continue the hearing and
subpoena the officers, if the defense wanted their testimony (id.).
The magistrate concluded that the hearsay statement regarding Officer's
Wolcott discovery of the paraphernalia and small baggie of residue was reliable,
admissible, and supported possession of paraphernalia in a drug free zone (R40:164

17). The magistrate ruled, however, that the agent's testimony concerning the large
baggie was insufficient to bind over on possession of a controlled substance in a
drug free zone:
I'm not going to move the prelim. That was a bad choice, counsel. You
know, probable cause can be established on hearsay. And I was
stretching it at the last hearing. But this one — all I've got is the officer's
received report from someone who said that someone was buying from
the defendant. He went to the location, didn't find anything himself.
He stepped outside, and then I have a report that an officer found some
drugs. I don't have any direct testimony that the drugs were located.
U r n - this one falls short. Um —I'm going to find that you failed to
meet your burden of proof now. I understand the — the burden for refiling. . . . Whether or not you legitimately or reasonably
underestimated the proof that would be necessary for today is not
before me. But you didn't meet your burden. So [the information] is
dismissed.
(R40:16-17). See Addendum C (Transcript of Preliminary Hearing).
The prosecutor moved for reconsideration and for permission to re-file the
information (R. 27-19).

The defense filed no response.

The magistrate

acknowledged that under rule 1102(b)(6), Utah Rules of Evidence, a non-testifying
officer's statement to a testifying officer is deemed reliable and admissible at
preliminary hearing, but still refused to modify his prior decision:
In this case, however, Officer Robertson [sic] didn't specifically recite
any statements of a non-testifying officer about the large baggie in the
carburetor. While the testimony was specific about Officer Watcott
[sic] reaching into the tear in the overhead tarp, the small baggie and
syringe, by themselves, contained insufficient quantities to establish a
felony charge. Officer Robertson [sic] was unable to state who
searched the carburetor or who found the large baggie of suspected
5

drugs. The view of the Court at the time of the preliminary hearing,
and now, is that this evidence was a step removed from hearsay and
that the Court was asked to simply assume from the circumstances that
some officer found the substance in a location that connected it to the
Defendant.
(R. 33-32) (emphasis in original). See Addendum B (Ruling & Order). The magistrate
did not address the prosecutor's request to re-file (id.).
On November 6, 2008, the magistrate entered a final order dismissing the
information in its entirety (R. 36) (Add. B).1 On November 10,2008, the State timely
appealed (R. 38).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was on probation and under the supervision of Adult Probation
and Parole Agent Kirt Robinson (R40: 3). Local law enforcement officers informed
Agent Robinson that individuals they had arrested had named Defendant as their
drug source (R40:3-4). Robinson decided to immediately contact Defendant about
the allegation (R40: 4). Because the agent intended to visit Defendant late at night,
he asked Provo City Police Officers Wolcott and Barker, who had worked closely
with the agent on other occasions, to accompany him (id.).

Given the magistrate's refusal to bind over the felony charge, it was
appropriate to also dismiss the misdemeanor charge that arose out of the same
criminal episode. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-402 & -403 (potentially barring
separate prosecutions for charges arising out of single criminal episode).
6

Agent Robinson and the two police officers arrived at Defendant's residence
at 1:00 a.m. on July 12, 2008 (R40: 3 & 4). The residence was "[a] shed, actually,
adjacent to his mother's mobile home" (R40: 4). Robinson knocked and Defendant
came to the door (id.). Robinson told Defendant why he was there and asked to
come in; Defendant said "sure" (R40: 5).
When Agent Robinson and Officer Barker entered, they found only Defendant
inside (id.). Defendant denied selling methamphetamine (id.). Agent Robinson
searched Defendant and a couch, but found no drugs (id.).
The interior of the shed was "extremely cluttered" (R40:6). Robinson testified
that there were "probably hundreds of small nooks and crannies, engine p a r t s , . . .
small containers, . . . I can't - I can't even go and - name all the places that are
possible to hide small amounts of anything" (id.). The agent called for a canine unit,
a search procedure he had utilized on other occasions (id.).
Utah County Sheriff's Deputy Nielsen arrived with a search dog (R40: 6).
Deputy Nielsen asked Agent Robinson and Defendant to step outside because the
shed was so "small, cramped" (R40: 7). Robinson and Defendant stood outside
while Deputy Nielsen conducted a canine sweep (id.). Deputy Nielsen told the
agent that the dog alerted around Defendant's bed and "another search was
conducted in the bed area down low," but nothing was found (id.). Deputy Nielsen
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then conducted a second canine sweep and told Agent Robinson, who was still
standing outside, that the dog had alerted on the ceiling area over the bed (R40: 7-8).
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor asked Agent Robinson what he did
after the second canine sweep (R40: 8). Agent Robinson responded that Officer
Wolcott found paraphernalia and a small baggie with residue in a ceiling tarp and
that the officers also discovered a large baggie of drugs in a carburetor next to
Defendant's bed:
U r n - a n o t h e r — another search was conducted in that area. Officer
Barker and Officer Wolcott—um — searched — um — basically the top of
the shed is covered in a tarp and all kinds of hanging material and
small objects. Um —there was a slit visible in the tarp. Um —Officer
Wolcott reached up through the slit and retrieved a syringe, a small
baggie with crystalline residue in its, and digital scales. Um -there —
there was also an engine part, a carburetor actually laying [sic] right
next to the bed. Um —the carburetor was taken apart, and inside, a
piece of the carburetor was another baggie, a pink, reddish colored
baggie. Um — it also had a crystalline substance in it
It appeared to
be methamphetamine.
(R40: 8). Robinson clarified that he was not inside the shed when the drugs were
discovered, but was "standing right outside the entrance" (R40: 11-12).

He

explained that after the search, the officers told him that they had dismantled the
carburetor and told him what they had found (R40:14). He further explained that
when he was initially inside the shed, he had seen the carburetor next to
Defendant's bed (R40:13). The agent testified that when the officers exited the shed,
the agent saw all the items seized (R40: 8 & 12-13).
8

Agent Robinson, who was familiar with drug field-testing, observed Officer
Barker field-test the contents of both baggies and confirmed that both tested positive
for methamphetamine (R40: 8-9).2 The shed was in a drug free zone (R40: 9).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rule 1102 (b)(6), Utah Rules of Evidence, directs that a non-testifying law
enforcement officer's statement to a testifying officer is reliable and admissible to
establish probable cause to bind over. The rule embodies the widely recognized
"fellow officer" or "collective knowledge" doctrine that presumes officer-to-officer
communications are reliable and permits probable cause to be based on the officers'
collective knowledge. Contrary to the magistrate's ruling, neither the rule nor the
doctrine require the testifying officer to witness the described search or to precisely
identify who did or said what in the course of the collective search. In sum, the
magistrate erred in his interpretation of rule 1102(b)(6).
Moreover, the facts here establish the reliability and admissibility of the
hearsay statement under other subsections of the same rule. The precise location of
the large baggie and which officer discovered it are, at most, foundational facts,
which may established by hearsay pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of rule 1102.
2

There was sufficient residue in the small baggie to test, but not to charge
possession (R.40: 8-9; R. 32). Instead, the residue supported that the scales and
syringe were drug paraphernalia. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-3 (West Supp.
2008) (drug paraphernalia defined). The large baggie of methamphetamine found in
the carburetor was the basis of the felony possession charge (R. 32).
9

Similarly, the non-testifying officers7 account of the discovery may constitute a
"present sense impression/ 7 a traditional hearsay exception, rendering the statement
admissible under subsection (b)(1) of the rule. Or, under these facts, the hearsay
statement has "similar indicia of reliability77 and is, therefore, admissible under
subsection (b)(9) of rule 1102. That the hearsay at issue is defined as reliable under
at least three other subsections of the rule further negates the magistrate's
conclusion that the hearsay was unreliable and, therefore, could not be credited.
The magistrate also erred in concluding that without the hearsay statement,
Agent Robinson's remaining testimony was insufficient to establish probable cause
to bind over on felony drug possession. Even if the hearsay is discarded, probable
cause existed based on the agent's eyewitness testimony that Defendant lived in the
shed and was its only occupant and that officers exited the shed holding a baggie of
methamphetamine. The precise location of that baggie within the shed is not critical
to probable cause.
In sum, this Court should reverse the magistrate's refusal to bind over and
reinstate the information so that the case may proceed to trial.

10

ARGUMENT
I.
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN HIS INTERPRETATION OF
UTAH R. EVID. 1102, THE RELIABLE HEARSAY RULE
The magistrate ruled the hearsay statement concerning the small baggie and
paraphernalia was admissible because Agent Robinson identified Officer Wolcott as
the officer who found these items (R. 33-32). The magistrate ruled the hearsay
statements concerning the discovery of the large baggie were unreliable and
inadmissible because the agent did not identify which officer discovered the baggie
or informed the agent of the discovery (R40: 16-17; R. 33-31). The ruling was
erroneous. Under rule 1102, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, both hearsay statements
were reliable and both were admissible at preliminary hearing.
It is well established that probable cause to support a criminal charge may be
based on hearsay, in whole or in part. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,36364 (1956) (hearsay permissible basis for grand jury indictment); State v. Pledger, 896
P.2d 1226, 1228 n.4 (Utah 1995) (under federal constitution, hearsay permissible
basis for criminal information and bindover). See also UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 12
(under state constitution, reliable hearsay permissible basis for criminal information
and bindover); UTAH R. CRIM. 7(i)(2) (hearsay "in whole or in part" permissible
basis for bindover) (Add. A). Accord State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, ^ 13-15,
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153 P.3d 830 (under federal and state constitutions, right of confrontation is trial
right, not pretrial right).
Consistent with this authority, rule 1102(a), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, directs
that "[r]eliable hearsay is admissible at criminal preliminary examinations/ 7 The
rule defines "reliable hearsay" to include, in pertinent part:
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of
Evidence;...
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any
exhibit;. ..
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace
officer;...
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless
of admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
See UTAH R. EVID. 1102(b) (1), (3), (6) & (9) (Add. A). In this case, the magistrate
specifically acknowledged rule 1102(b)(6), but did not correctly interpret or apply it.
See Add. B (Ruling).
The Advisory Committee Note to rule 1102 states that subsection (b)(6) "is
similar to the 'fellow officer' rule applicable to search or arrest warrant affidavits/'
See Add. A. See also Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, Tj 18 n.6,133 P.3d 370 (advisory
committee notes "merit great weight" in interpreting evidentiary rules).

The

"fellow officer" rule, also known as the "collective knowledge" doctrine, was
established decades before adoption of rule 1102. See United States v. Veniresca, 380
12

U.S. 102, 107408, 110-111 (1965) (officers7 collective knowledge sufficient to
establish probable cause for search); State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986)
(officers' collective knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause for arrest)).
The fellow officer doctrine recognizes that a probable cause determination
requires only a low level of proof and is based on a practical, not abstract or
technical, interpretation of facts:
[A] finding of "probable cause" may rest upon evidence which is not
legally competent in a criminal trial. . . . There is a large difference
between the two things to be proved (guilt and probable cause), as well
as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like
difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them.
Thus hearsay may be the basis [for probable cause] so long as there is a
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay
[Hjearsay information..
. need not reflect the direct personal observations of [the officer
swearing to the information] so long as the magistrate is informed of
some of the underlying circumstances supporting [the officer's]
conclusions and his belief that any [person involved in providing the
information] whose identity need not be disclosed was credible or his
information reliable.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 107-08 (citations and quotation marks omitted). See Dorsey, 731
P.2d at 1088 (police officers "entitled to rely on . . . [observations of fellow officers
. . . engaged in a common investigation" to establish probable cause). Indeed, under
the fellow officer doctrine, the swearing officer may rely not only on hearsay
statements of a fellow officer, but also on double hearsay, that is, a fellow officer's
recitation of another officer's observations. See State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 192
(Utah 1986) ("double hearsay between police officers is not fatal" to probable cause);
13

State v. Prows, 2007 UT App 4 0 9 , \ 13,178 P.3d 908 (reasonable suspicion need not
be based on personal knowledge of detaining officer, but "on the totality of the
circumstances and 'the collective knowledge of all the officers involved 7 ").
The fellow officer doctrine recognizes that "there is a presumption that law
enforcements officers will convey information to each other truthfully." Nielsen, 727
P.3d at 192. The same presumption underlies rule 1102(b)(6)/s recognition that
officers' out-of-court communications to each other are admissible at preliminary
hearing because such communications are reliable.
Here, the magistrate refused to recognize rule 1102(b)(6)'s presumption of
reliability and admissibility. In part, this was due to the magistrate's erroneous
belief that the rule required something more to establish the reliability of the
statement, that is, that the rule required the agent to witness the seizures himself or
to specifically identify the officer who made the seizures (R. 32). As discussed,
supra, neither the language of subsection (b)(6) nor its underlying doctrine requires
this.
Moreover, in rejecting rule 1102(b) (6)'s presumption of reliability, the
magistrate misconstrued the facts. The magistrate found that Agent Robinson "was
unable to state who searched the carburetor or who found the larger baggie of
suspected drugs" (R. 32). The agent, however, was never asked to identify which
officer found the baggie or told him of the discovery. During direct examination,
14

the agent testified that Officers Wolcott and Barker conducted the search and found
the large baggie, but did not distinguish between the two officers (R40: 8-9). See also
Statement of Facts, supra. On cross-examination, the agent was not asked which
officer discovered the large baggie or informed him of the discovery:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Urn - so you weren't the one who saw
where anything was located?
AGENT ROBINSON: Urn—no, I'm not the one who removed the items
from the location.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. U m THE COURT: That wasn't the question. Ask the question again.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You--you were not the one who saw where the
items were located?
AGENT ROBINSON:

No.

(R40:12). On re-direct, the prosecutor did not ask the agent to specify which officer
found the large baggie:
PROSECUTOR: Did you observe the search yourself—were you able to
see it from where you were standing with Mr. Valdez? . ..
AGENT ROBINSON: No. I was not. I did not observe it.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. The officers told you what they found.
AGENT ROBINSON: Yes

PROSECUTOR: T h e y - did you see [the items] after they were found?
AGENT ROBINSON:

Yes.

PROSECUTOR: And was that still at the location?
15

AGENT ROBINSON:

Yes.

(R40: 14-15).
The magistrate also ignored rule 1102(b)(6)'s presumption of reliability and
admissibility when he discredited the hearsay because it was "one step removed"
from traditional hearsay and required the magistrate to "simply assume from the
circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location that connected it to
the Defendant" (R. 32) (Add. B) (emphasis in original). Again, the language of rule
1102 does not support the magistrate's view; nor do the facts.
Agent Robinson testified that the only place searched was the shed that
Defendant used as a residence. The agent explained that Deputy Nielsen conducted
the canine sweeps and that Officers Wolcott and Barker conducted the physical
searches, immediately after the canine sweeps. See Statement of Facts, supra. The
agent further testified that when the officers exited the shed after the searches, they
had a small baggie of what appeared to be residue, some apparent drug
paraphernalia, and a large baggie of what appeared to be methamphetamine crystal.
See id. The inference to be drawn from the evidence is not what the magistrate
suggested — that some officer found some drugs in some place connected to
Defendant—but that Officers Wolcott and Barker, searching in concert, found the
illegal items in Defendant's small residence during a probation search.

16

Similarly, the magistrate erred in concluding that hearsay that is "one step
removed" from traditional hearsay exceptions is unreliable and inadmissible. As
discussed, supra, rule 1102(b)(6) directs that officers' hearsay communications are
reliable and admissible, even if such communications are admissible at trial. Other
subsections of the same rule also demonstrate the fallacy of the magistrate's
interpretation.
Subsection (b)(1) of rule 1102 recognizes that evidence that is admissible at
trial under traditional evidentiary rules is necessarily reliable and admissible at
preliminary hearing. But rule 1102 also recognizes that hearsay that is "one step
removed" from traditional rules may nevertheless be reliable and admissible at
preliminary hearing. For example, under subsection (b)(3) of the rule, hearsay
evidence establishing foundation is deemed reliable and admissible. Here, who
found the large baggie and precisely where baggie was found were, at most,
foundational facts and, thus, admissible under subsection (b)(3). As it happened, no
foundation was needed in this preliminary hearing because the baggie was not
introduced into evidence.

Nevertheless, the hearsay statement was of no

significance in establishing probable cause. Agent Robinson's own observation and
description of the search established that the search dog entered and left the shed,
two officers than entered the shed, the two officers then emerged from the shed with
two baggies that were tested and proved to contain methamphetamine.
17

See

Statement of Facts, supra. These observed facts establish probable cause to believe the
shed contained illegal drugs.
Similarly, under rule 1102(b)(1), the hearsay statement concerning the
discovery of the large baggie would be reliable and admissible if it were a "present
sense impression" under traditional hearsay rules. See UTAH R. EVID. 803(1) (out-ofcourt "statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter"
admissible "even though the declarant is available as a witness"). But even if the
hearsay statement were "one step removed" from this traditional hearsay exception,
subsection (b)(9) of rule 1102 would still deem the statement admissible at
preliminary hearing if it had "similar indicia of reliability." Here, such indicia of
reliability exist given the testifying agent's own observations of the large baggie
after the officers emerged from the shed and the agent's personal knowledge that a
carburetor was next to Defendant's bed. See Statement of Facts, supra.
Though the magistrate only considered admissibility under subsection (b)(6),
the fellow officer provision, the reliability that these other subsections accord the
same evidence undermines the magistrate's conclusion that hearsay "one step
removed" from traditional admission is unreliable and inadmissible. In sum, the
magistrate erred in demanding greater reliability than rule 1102 requires for the
admission of the hearsay statements.
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II.
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
REMAINING TESTIMONY WAS INSUFFICIENT FOR
BINDOVER
Regardless of the admissibility of the hearsay statements, Agent Robinson's
other testimony established probable cause to believe that Defendant possessed
methamphetamine. Consequently, the magistrate erred in concluding that the
evidence was insufficient for bindover on felony drug possession.
As discussed, probable cause to support a bindover requires only that the
prosecution present sufficient evidence to support "a reasonable belief that
Defendant committed the crime charged. See State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, Tf 18,137
P.3d 787 (citing Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16, 20 p.3d 300). This, in turn, requires the
magistrate to view the evidence "in a light most favorable to the prosecution,, and to
draw all reasonable inferences "in the prosecution's favor." State v. Schroyer, 2002
UT 26, % 10, 44 P.3d 730 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The magistrate
"may only disregard or discredit evidence that is 'wholly lacking and incapable of
'creating a reasonable inference regarding a portion of the prosecution's claim."
Virgin, 2006 UT 29, | 24 (quoting State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998)).
Accord State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 392, ^ 6,174 P.3d 654, cert, denied, 187 P.3d 232.
Here, the magistrate drew but one inference — that some officer found some
drugs in some place connected to Defendant—and concluded the inference was
19

insufficient to support a bindover (R. 32-31). The inference is neither reasonable nor
drawn in favor of the information.
Disregarding any hearsay statements, the evidence establishes that Defendant
used the shed as his residence and was its sole occupant; Agent Robinson ordered a
canine sweep of the shed; after the canine sweep, Officers Wolcott and Barker then
conducted a physical search of the shed; the officers exited the shed a short time
later with a small baggie of what appeared to be residue, a large baggie of what
appeared to be methamphetamine crystal, and drug paraphernalia; the baggies were
tested and confirmed to contain methamphetamine. See Statement of Facts, supra.
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from this evidence is that one or both of
the searching officers found methamphetamine inside Defendant's shed and that
Defendant knowingly possessed it. The magistrate erred in not making this
inference and in refusing to bind over.
The magistrate's refusal to view the prosecution favorably — despite the
evidence supporting bindover —is also evident in the magistrate's denial of a
continuance. Rule 1102(c)(1) recognizes that a continuance of a preliminary hearing
may be warranted if "[t]he magistrate finds the hearsay evidence admitted is not
sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for bindover/' In this case, the
hearsay evidence was admitted without objection and the prosecution rested. Only
after this did the defense claim and the magistrate rule that the already admitted
20

hearsay was unreliable and, consequently, could not be considered. See Statement of
the Case, supra. When the prosecutor realized that the magistrate was considering
dismissal, she offered to subpoena Officers Wolcott and Barker if a continuance was
granted. The magistrate refused, even though there had been no prior continuances
of the hearing. The refusal was unreasonable, given the lack of a timely objection to
the admission of the hearsay statements. Cf Barson v. E.R.Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d
832,837 (Utah 1984) (hearsay objection untimely when not raised during testimony).
Indeed, if the defense —or the magistrate —had asked Agent Robinson to identify
which officer discovered the large baggie or informed him of its discovery, the
perceived problem would have been resolved. Instead, no objections were made or
clarifications sought. See State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322, % 18,142 P.3d 581, (timely
objection precludes a party from withholding objection to enhance chances of
dismissal or acquittal, ajfd, 2008 UT 47,190 P.3d 1255. But even if Agent Robinson
had specifically identified the officer, that identification would not have increased
probable cause. For, here, the officers acted in concert in searching and no matter
who discovered the larger baggie or who informed the agent of the discovery, the
baggie of methamphetamine was found in Defendant's shed. That fact was all that
was necessary for bindover on felony possession.
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In sum, even if the hearsay statements are discarded, Agent Robinson's
remaining testimony supports a "reasonable belief that Defendant illegally
possessed methamphetamine.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the refusal to bind over,
reinstate the information, and allow the case to proceed to trial.
Respectfully submitted May 18, 2009.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellant
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UTAH CONSTITUTION

Art. 1, § 12

Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Laws 1994, SJ.R. 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov. 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1, 1995.

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
RULE 7.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRATE

(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons.
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate
for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be filed
without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense.
(c)(1) In order to detain any person arrested without a warrant, as soon as is
reasonably feasible but in no event longer than 48 hours after the arrest, a
determination shall be made as to whether there is probable cause to continue
to detain the arrestee. The determination may be made by any magistrate,
although if the arrestee is charged with a capital offense, the magistrate may
not be a justice court judge. The arrestee need not be present at the probable
cause determination.
(c)(2) A written probable cause statement shall be presented to the magistrate, although the statement may be verbally communicated by telephone,
telefaxed, or otherwise electronically transmitted to the magistrate.
(c)(2)(A) A statement which is verbally communicated by telephone shall be
reduced to a sworn written statement prior to submitting the probable cause
issue to the magistrate for decision. The person reading the statement to the
magistrate shall verify to the magistrate that the person is reading the written
statement verbatim, and shall write on the statement that person's name and
title, the date and time of the communication with the magistrate, and the
determination the magistrate directs to be indicated on the statement.
(c)(2)(B) If a statement is verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or
otherwise electronically transmitted, the original statement shall, as soon as
practicable, be filed with the court where the case will be filed.
(c)(3) The magistrate shall review the probable cause statement and from it
determine whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee.
(c)(3)(A) If the magistrate finds there is not probable cause to continue to
detain the arrestee, the magistrate shall order the immediate release of the
arrestee.
(c)(3)(B) If the magistrate finds probable cause to continue to detain the
arrestee, the magistrate shall immediately make a bail determination. The bail
determination shall coincide with the recommended bail amount in the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule unless the magistrate finds substantial cause to deviate
from the Schedule.
(c)(4) The presiding district court judge shall, in consultation with the Justice
Court Administrator, develop a rotation of magistrates which assures availability of magistrates consistent with the need in that particular district. The
schedule shall take into account the case load of each of the magistrates, their
location and their willingness to serve.
(c)(5) Nothing in this subsection (c) is intended to preclude the accomplishment of other procedural processes at the time of the determination referred to
in paragraph (c)(1) above.
(d)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was
committed the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to
the county where the crime was committed and shall be taken before the
proper magistrate under these rules.

(d)(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for which a
voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under Subsection
77-7-21(1), the person arrested may state in writing a desire to forfeit bail,
waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, and consent to
disposition of the case in the county in which the person was arrested, is held,
or is present.
(d)(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or
copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which the defendant is
arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue in that county.
(d)(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the
warrant.
(d)(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor
for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay
before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination of bail
under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held without bail under Section
77-20-1.
(d)(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate.
(e) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon
the defendant's first appearance, inform the defendant:
(e)(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy;
(e)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information and how to obtain them;
(e)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court
without expense if unable to obtain counsel;
(e)(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and
(e)(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that the
statements the defendant does make may be used against the defendant in a
court of law.
(f) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph (e)
and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any attorney
by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee.
(g) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea.
(g)(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate
as provided by law.
(g)(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not be
extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these rules
and law applicable to criminal cases.
(h)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to
a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court.

(h)(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be
held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the defendant is in
custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if the defendant is
not in custody. These time periods may be extended by the magistrate for good
cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be held if the defendant is
indicted.
(i)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held
under the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The
state has the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the
conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call
witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine adverse witnesses.
(i)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed
it, the magistrate shall order that the defendant be bound over to answer in the
district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in
whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by
unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination.
(i)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.
(j) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded.
On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators to be
excluded from the courtroom.
(k)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district court,
the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall transmit to
the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records made of the
proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any
typewritten transcript.
(k)(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff,
the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order.
(/ )(1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material witness
in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is required, the
magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a sum considered
adequate for the appearance of the witness.
(/ )(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the
court, the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness complies
or is otherwise legally discharged.
(/ )(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be
discharged.
(/)(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be used at
the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the witness.

RULES OF EVIDENCE
R U L E 1 1 0 2 . RELIABLE HEARSAY IN CRIMINAL PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS
(a) Statement of the Rule. Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal preliminary examinations.
(b) Definition of Reliable Hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary
examinations only, reliable hearsay includes:
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of Evidence;
(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary
examination;
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any
exhibit;
(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records;
(5) medical and autopsy reports and records;
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer;
(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual offense
which is promptly reported by the child victim and recorded in accordance
with Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed
verbatim which is:
(A) under oath or affirmation; or
(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement
made therein is punishable.
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of
admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(c) Continuance for Production of Additional Evidence. If hearsay evidence
is proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a continuance of the
hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing additional evidence if:
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is
not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests
of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice.
[Adopted effective April 1, 1999.]

Rule 1102 Advisory Committee Note cont. on next page

Rule 1102
Advisory Committee Note
Rule 1102 applies only in criminal preliminary examinations, and implements
language added by amendment to Article
I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, effective July 1, 1995:
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute.
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as
defined by statute or rule in whole or in
part at an}' preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of
the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
Discovery is allowed under Rule 16,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well
as by case law and other statutes.
Accordingly, paragraph (a) provides for
admissibility of "reliable hearsay" evidence in criminal preliminary examinations (commonly called "preliminary hearings ")• To the extent that State v. Anderson,
612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), prohibited the
use of hearsay evidence at preliminary examinations, that case has been abrogated.
Paragraph (b) defines "reliable hearsay"
in subparagraphs (1) through (8). Evidence which is admissible under any other
law or rule of evidence is not rendered
inadmissible by anything in paragraph (b).
Subparagraph (b)(2) specifically incorporates hearsay that would be admissible
under U.R.E. 804 but eliminates the foundational element of unavailability.
Subparagraph (b)(3) permits the admission of exhibits in preliminary hearings
even though the necessary foundation for
admissibility is by hearsay only. For examsubparagraph (b)(9). If there is special reason for exploring foundation or authenticity, subparagraph (c) gives the magistrate
power to require additional evidence after
a continuance.
Paragraph (c) provides for continuances
in the preliminary examination to enable a
party to provide live witnesses or a more
reliable form of hearsay where a party is
substantially disadvantaged by the admission or exclusion of hearsay evidence proffered under this rule.
Under subparagraph (c)(1), the prosecution can get a continuance where hearsay
evidence is not admitted and would be
necessary to get the case bound over.
Under subparagraph (c)(2), a defendant
may obtain a continuance by demonstrat-

ple, proving the chain of custody for controlled substances may be accomplished
under this section without calling the witnesses in the chain.
Subparagraphs (b)(4) and (b)(5) permit
the specified types of reports and records
to be admitted without the testimony of
the person who prepared the report or
record or the custodian of the record. If
there is special reason for exploring foundation or authenticity, subparagraph (c)
gives the magistrate power to require additional evidence after a continuance.
Subparagraph (b)(6) is similar to the
"fellow officer" rule applicable to search
or arrest warrant affidavits as providing
sufficiently "reliable" evidence.
Subparagraph (b)(7) requires that a
child victim's hearsay report be close in
time to the event reported and that it be
recorded in compliance with the conditions prescribed in Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure 15.5(l)(a) through (d). This subparagraph does not necessitate a hearing
under Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
15.5 (l)(e) through (h) as a prerequisite to
admission at a preliminary examination.
Under subparagraph (b)(8), written, recorded, or transcribed testimony of nontestifying witnesses is admissible if it is
sworn, affirmed, or given under notification that false statements are prosecutable.
The potential for prosecution under perjury or other criminal provisions tends to
ensure the reliability of such testimony.
Subparagraph (b)(9) provides catchall
admissibility for other forms of hearsay of
similar reliability, not unlike U.R.E. Rules
803(24) and 804(5) provide under existing
hearsay exceptions. Unlike U.R.E. Rules
803(24) and 804(5), there is no requirement that advance notice be given to the
adverse party of evidence offered under
ing that he is substantially and unfairly
disadvantaged by a particular proffer of
evidence that would be otherwise admissible under the rule and the disadvantage
outweighs the interests of the witness and
the efficient administration of justice. In
making a decision as to whether the defendant is substantially and unfairly disadvantaged by the use of reliable hearsay evidence, a magistrate may, among other
factors, take into consideration the limitations on discovery available to the defendant.
Either party is at liberty to subpoena
and call any live witnesses whose testimony would be germane to the determination
of probable cause.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COqjRT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
State of Utah,

:
Ruling
Plaintiff

:

vs.

:

Date: October 9,2008

Jesse Valdez,

:

Case Number: 081402004

:

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendant

This matter comes before the Court on the State's motion for reconsideration of this
Court's ruling that the State failed to meet its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing held
August 28, 2008.
The State relied upon a single witness at the preliminary hearing. Probation Officer Curt
Robertson testified that he had received "numerous" calls from other law enforcement agencies
complaining that Mr. Valdez was involved in selling narcotics. As the agent assigned to Mr.
Valdez, Mr. Robertson went with several Provo police officers to the shed where Mr. Valdez
lived at 1 a.m. on July 12, 2008. After several knocks Mr. Valdez came to the door and let
Officer Robertson in. Mr. Valdez, himself, was searched and nothing was found. A couch was
searched and nothing was found. Nothing was found during a quick search of the interior of the
shed although the place was extremely cluttered with hundreds of nooks, crannies and
automobile parts in which drugs could be hidden. Officer Robertson requested a canine search.
Deputy Nielson, a K-9 officer for the Utah County Sheriffs Office arrived. Officer Robertson
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was asked to take Mr. Valdez outside while the dog searched. Deputy Nielson came out and
reported that the dog alerted on an area near the bed.
Officers other than Officer Robertson searched while Robertson remained outside with
Valdez. Nothing was found. The dog conducted another search and Deputy Nielson reported
that the dog seemed to be interested in something "higher." Provo officers Barker and Watcott
re-entered the shed and searched again. Officer Robertson did not observe the search.
Officer Robertson testified that "officers," told him that Officer Watcott reached into a
slit in an overhead tarp above the bed and retrieved a syringe and a baggie with a very slight bit
of what appeared to be drug residue. He also understood that someone identified and
disassembled an automobile carburetor next to the bed and found a baggie with a larger amount
of crystal substance. The Court has re-listened to the testimony and cannot determine that
Officer Robertson identified who told him that the carburetor had been searched or who did the
searching of the carburetor. Officer Robertson testified quite specifically that he did not observe
either physical search following the K-9 sweeps and had no personal knowledge about who
located what or where the items were located. Both baggies were field tested and a positive
result for methamphetamine was received.
Rule 1102 allows the use of reliable hearsay at criminal preliminary hearings. Reliable
hearsay is defined at 1102(b)(6) as "a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying
peace officer." In this case, however, Officer Robertson didn't specifically recite any statements
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of a non-testifying officer about the larger baggie found in the carburetor. While the testimony
was specific about Officer Watcott reaching into the tear in the overhead tarp, the smaller baggie
and syringe, by themselves, contained insufficient quantities to establish the felony charge.
Officer Robertson was unable to state who searched the carburetor or who found the larger
baggie of suspected drugs. The view of the Court at the time of the preliminary hearing, and
now, is that this evidence was a step removed from hearsay and that the Court was asked to
simply assume from the circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location that
connected it to the Defendant.
It has long been the tradition, in Utah Courts, to protect the basic right to confront
witnesses at a preliminary hearing. In State v. Anderson, 612 P2d 778 at 786 (Utah, 1980) the
Court noted:
. . . the ancillary benefits inherent in this preliminary proceeding,
e.g., the various aspects of discovery incident to the pretrial
examination of prosecution witnesses, would be seriously curtailed
by denying the defendant a right of confrontation at the hearing.
This curtailment would infringe upon the defendant's right to a fair
trial, by denying him the opportunity to prepare an effective defense.
For example, the cross-examination of witnesses at this
preliminary stage in a criminal prosecution provides the defendant
an opportunity to attack their testimony before it becomes
immutable by repetition and the influence, however legitimate, of
the prosecution. Also, favorable testimony will often be elicited
from the cross-examination of the witnesses at the preliminary
examination and contradictory statements made at the hearing may
subsequently become important as tools for attacking the
credibility of the witnesses at the actual trial.
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The specific prohibition from Anderson on the use of hearsay testimony at a preliminary
hearing has been overturned by amendment to the Utah Constitution in 1996 (Article 1, Section
12) and the adoption of Rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence in 1995. But the fundamental
purpose of preliminary hearings remains unaltered. In this case the State asked the Court to rely
not on a specific declaration of a non-testifying officer but upon the assumption of Officer
Robertson that information he had obtained came from one of several officers who were there
and found what was then field tested. This vague, unspecific presentation was not "reliable
hearsay" and, without those inferences the testimony presented by the State was insufficient to
meet the burden of proof required at a preliminary hearing.
The Court respectfully declines to modify its previous ruling.

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY

4TH DSSTRICT \
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
JESSE VALDEZ,
Defendant.

Case No. 081402004
Judge James R. Taylor

THE COURT, having heard the evidence at the preliminary hearing and considered the
State's motion for reconsideration, hereby enters its FINAL ORDER dismissing all charges against
the defendant in this matter.

DATED this Q> day of

JbWj

,2008.

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

JAMES jL TA
DISTRICT COURT
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 081402004

vs.
PRELIMINARY HEARING
JESSE VALDEZ,
Defendant.
-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2 8th day of August,
2008, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before
the HONORABLE JAMES TAYLOR, sitting as Judge in the abovenamed Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the
following proceedings were had.
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THE COURT:

I think in this circumstance, again,

this is one where if you look and you're not sure who did
the field sobriety, better get a chemical test done -- or -or figure that out.
met in this case.

Urn -- so anyway, the -- the burden is

Do you want to enter a plea today?

MR. GALE:

Urn -- judge, could we come back for an

entry plea?
THE COURT:
other case.

Alright, well, let's move on to the

And then we will address both procedurally.

(Inaudible)
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

So they're both second

degree felonies?
THE COURT:

It's -- it's possession of drugs and

possession of paraphernalia we have opted to a second degree
felony -- that's a misdemeanor.
(Inaudible)
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Okay.

State would call Kirt

Robinson.
THE COURT:
CLERK:

Mr. Robinson, come be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony

you are about to give in the case pertaining before this
court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you god?
MR. ROBINSON:
THE COURT:

Yes I do.

Thank you.

Have a seat.
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MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN

Would you state your name

and occupation, please?
MR. ROBINSON:

Kirt Robinson, an agent for Adult

Probation and Parole.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

And what are your duties in

that position'?
MR. ROBINSON:

My duties are to supervise persons

on probation or parole in our community for THE COURT:
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Are you a probation officer

for Mr. Jesse Valdez?
MR. ROBINSON:

I am.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Do you recognize him in the

court today?
MR. ROBINSON:

Yes I do.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

And on July 12, 2 008, urn --

were you also his probation agent at that time?
MR. ROBINSON:

Yes I was.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

And -- and in the very early

morning hours of that date, urn -- what were you doing?

What

were you involved with?
MR. ROBINSON:

Urn -- at approximately 1:00 in the

morning, I conducted a field visit on Mr. Valdez's
residence.

Urn -- the reason for the field visit is I

received numerous phone calls from various law enforcement
agencies, either the Provo police department, or Utah County

3

major crimes task force indicating that Mr. Valdez was
involved in the selling of methamphetamine.

Urn -- they had

received their information from various people they had
taken into custody who had either -- what I understood from
them -- purchased from Mr. Valdez or had seen Mr. Valdez
selling methamphetamine.

Urn -- I felt it necessary to act

at that time and conducted a field visit.

Therefore, it was

very early in the morning.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

What happened when you

conducted that field visit?
MR. ROBINSON:

Urn - - I - - sense a supervise people

in -- in Provo, urn -- we are pretty close with C O . P.,
Officers, officer Barker and Officer Wolcott are both
involved with the C O . P. program with the Provo police.
asked them to assist me.

Urn -- it was kind of hard at 1:00

AM to find other agents working.
Valdez's residence.

I

Urn -- we went over to Mr.

I knocked on the door.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Urn -- there was

And by his residence, what

are you referring to?
MR. ROBINSON:

A shed, actually, adjacent to his

mother's mobile home at 435 north, 2045 west in Provo.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:
MR. ROBINSON:
knocked again.

Okay.

I knocked.

And you knocked.
There was a pause.

I

He eventually answered, approached the door.
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He appeared a little disoriented.
up.

He had been asleep.

assumed it to be true.

He said he had just woken i

And at that hour in the morning, I

Urn -- I asked if I could come in.

Mr. Valdez said, "sure, come on in."
entered the residence.

Me and Officer Barker

Urn -- I asked Mr. Valdez basically

what he had been doing for the night.

He said he had just

been, "hanging out."
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Was there anybody else in

that residence?
MR. ROBINSON:

There wasn't

It was just Mr.

Valdez.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:
MR. ROBINSON:

Okay.

Urn -- I told Mr. Valdez why I was

there -- that I had received information that he had been
involved in the selling of methamphetamine.
if there was any in the residence or on him.

Urn -- I asked
He denied it.

Urn -- I searched his person at that time and then searched a
couch, which is inside the -- urn -- residents.

I guess you

would call it a residence -- and sat him down on the couch.
After that occurred, I proceeded to search the rest of his
living area.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

And in conducting the search

of his person and the couch, did you locate anything?
MR. ROBINSON:

I did not.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Okay.

So you continued the
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search.

What did you find?
MR. ROBINSON:

Um -- at that point -- his -- his

living quarters are extremely -- and when I say extremely -I mean extremely cluttered.

Um -- there are probably

hundreds of small nooks and crannies, engine parts, um -small containers, um -- I can't -- can't even go and -- and
name all the places that are possible to hide small amounts
of anything.

Um --

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

So given those conditions,

did you decide to do something further?
MR. ROBINSON:

I did.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:
MR. ROBINSON:

And what was --

I -- I requested a canine officer

to have his canine come through and do a sweep of the area.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:
MR. ROBINSON:

Did that happen?

It did.

Deputy Nielsen with Utah

County sheriff's office arrived with his canine and
conducted a search with his dog.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Are you familiar with canine

searches yourself?
MR. ROBINSON:

I am.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:
MR. ROBINSON:

Why is that?

I've used them in the past -- um --

multiple times to -- to help locate at least a general area
where I can concentrate my search and find controlled
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substances.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

So what was the result of

this particular canine search?
MR. ROBINSON:

Urn -- I was not --at that time

when the canine arrived, Deputy Nielsen asked that -because it's such a small, cramped quarter, he asked that I
remove Mr. Valdez from the area so his canine could do a
proper search of the area.

I did remove Mr. Valdez.

We

stood outside, in front of his -- his living area -- that
is, in front of the shed.

Urn -- the canine entered and did

a preliminary sweep and Mr. Nielsen -- excuse me, Deputy
Nielsen urn -- exited the area and actually indicated that
the dog had indicated in the bed an area of the shed, urn -another search was conducted in that bed area down low.

And

in some -- some surrounding compartments -- containers,
nothing was found at that time.

He brought the dog in

again, the canine, for a secondary sweep.

Again, indicating

the same area, but this time it seemed to indicate -- and
from what I was told by Deputy Nielsen -- upper -- the dog
was sniffing towards the ceiling of the shed.
at that time, I was not present.

Urn - - again,

Urn -- I was actually

standing outside -- in the front of the shed, again, with
Mr. Valdez.

Urn --

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Did you see any of this

occurring?
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MR. ROBINSON:

1
2

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

MR. ROBINSON:

Yes.

Deputy Nielsen and Officer

Barker.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

7
8

But the officers told you

about it?

5
6

I did

not.

3
4

The secondary sweep, no.

As a result of that

secondary search by the canine, what did you then do?
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MR. ROBINSON:

10

conducted in that area.

11

-- urn -- searched -- urn -- basically the top of the shed is
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covered in a tarp and all kinds of hanging material and

13

small objects.

14

Urn -- Officer Wolcott reached up through the slit and

15

retrieved a syringe, a small baggie with crystalline residue

16

m

17

engine part, a carburetor actually laying right next to the

18

bed.

19

piece of the carburetor was another baggie, a pink, reddish

20

colored baggie.

21

m

22
23

Um -- another -- another search was
Officer Barker and Officer Wolcott

Urn -- there was a slit visible m

it, and digital scales.

the tarp.

Urn -- there -- there was also an

Urn -- the carburetor was taken apart, and inside, a

Urn -- it also had a crystalline substance

it.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

And m

your experience, did

you recognize that crystalline substance?

24

MR. ROBINSON.

It appeared to be methamphetamine.
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MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

The plastic baggie that you

found in the tarp, urn -- with residue -- how much residue?
MR. ROBINSON:

Urn -- very little, but enough to be

recognized.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Okay.

And were those

substances field tested?
MR. ROBINSON:

They were.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

What were the results of

that?
MR. ROBINSON:

Urn -- both tested positive for

methamphetamine.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Okay.

And what else was in

the area -- what other buildings were within 1000 feet of
this location?
MR. ROBINSON:

There was a church within 1000 feet

of this residence.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:
questions at this time.
MR. GALE:

Okay.

I have no further

Thank you.

Urn - - agent Robinson, if I understand

you right, urn -- you -- urn, you believed that Mr. Valdez had
violated his probation because of information you got from
different police agencies.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:
with him.

Is that right?

Mm-hmm.

So you went to his residence to talk

You talked with him.

He denied using any illicit

substances.
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MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

He did.

Okay.

Urn - - you didn't see any

substances when you were talking with him in his shed - - o r
i

residence?
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

I did not.

Okay.

Urn -•- yet you asked him to

submit to a search of that residence.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Yes.

And -- urn --- you searched the residence

and you didn' t find anything.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

No.

Okay.

Urn --- at that point, you decided

to call a dog
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Yes.

And you called the dog.

or indicated on a couple of locations.

The dog hit --

You searched again

and you didn' t find anything.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Correct.

Okay.

Then you t)rought the dog in a

1 second time. And the dog again indicated on several
locations.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Yes.

Okay.

And urn - - I think -- urn -- it

was the officers -- Officer Barker andL Officer Nielsen, is
!that right?
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MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Deputy Nielsen, yes.

Okay.

Officer Barker and Deputy

Nielsen who actually did the search, is that right?
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Okay.

MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

The second time, yes.
You weren't there?

The secondary one, I was not.

Okay.

This was actually the third

search, is that right?
MR. ROBINSON:

Oh -- yeah.

Third search

conducted, second after canine indication.
MR. GALE:

Okay.

Urn - - and you didn't ever think

of going and getting a warrant after the first two searches
or anything like that?
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

I did not.

Okay.

Urn - - and so -- urn -- you were

outside and the officers actually did the search?
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

I did remove Mr. Valdez.

Okay.

Urn - - and so where -- where were

you outside with him -- outside of the shed with him?
MR. ROBINSON:

And just standing right outside the

entrance.
MR. GALE:

Okay.

And the officers and the canine

were inside.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Yes.

Okay.

Urn -- and so when you say, about

11

the carburetor, about the tarp

that -- 1that kind of stuff,

that isn' t something that you saw, that is something that
the other off icer saw.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Yes.
So it's just something you heard

Okay.

about sec ondhand.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Yes it is.

Okay.

Urn - - s o you weren't the one who

saw where anything was located";>
MR. ROBINSON:

Um -- no, I'm not the one who

removed the items from the location.
MR. GALE:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Um --

That wasn't the question.

Ask the

question again.
MR. GALE:

You -- you were not the one who saw

1 where the items were located.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE-

No.

Um -- you didn't do a field test?

MR. ROBINSON.

I was present while the field test

was being conducted, yes.
MR. GALE:

You --

MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

I did not personally conduct it.

You did -- you didn t personally do a

field test.
MR. ROBINSON:

No, I did not.
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MR. GALE:

Okay.

Who personally did do the field

test?
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Officer Barker did.

Okay.

Have you ever done a field test

before?
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Yes I have.

Okay.

Urn -- officer Barker did the

field test?
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

And you saw it?

MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Yes he did.

Yes.

Okay.

I was standing right there.

And urn - - and that tested

positive?
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Positive.

And it was for something that was --

got inside the carburetor.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Correct.

Okay.

You don't know where that

carburetor -- you did not see where that carburetor was
located?
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

I --

Where it was located?

MR. ROBINSON:

I -- I knew where the carburetor

was located from my previous two searches.
MR. GALE:

Okay.
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MR. ROBINSON:

But I was not present when the

methamphetamine was removed from the carburetor, no.
MR. GALE:

Okay.

So you were told that the

methamphetamine was removed from the carburetor?
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Correct.

Okay.

MR. ROBINSON:
MR. GALE:

Correct.

Urn - - I don't have anything further .

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Did you observe the search

yourself -- were you able to see it from where you were
standing with Mr. Valdez?
MR. ROBINSON:

Urn -- the third -- where the --

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:
MR. ROBINSON:

-the items were actually found?

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:
MR. ROBINSON:

The search with --

No.

Right.
I was not.

I did not observe

it.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Okay.

The officers told you

what they found.
MR. ROBINSON:

Yes.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:
MR. ROBINSON:

At the time --

Yes.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

They -- did you see them

after they were found?
MR. ROBINSON:

Yes.
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MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

And was that still at the

location?
MR. ROBINSON:

Yes.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Okay.

Thank you.

Urn --

state has no further questions for this witness.
MR. GALE:
THE COURT:

Nothing further at this time.
Thank you.

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

You can step down.

No -- no further witnesses

at this point.
THE COURT:
MR. GALE:
evidence.

Judge, we don't intend to present any

Urn -THE COURT:
MR. GALE:

order.

Mr. Gale?

Do you want to be heard?
Urn -- I would like to be heard on the

Urn -- judge, urn -- my argument is essentially the

same thing that it was on the last case.

Urn -- here we have

an officer -- or a probation agent who was not actually
present urn -- when the items were actually located in the
shed.

Urn -- I think its -- it's a fairly simple task to

bring in the people that located the substance.

Urn -- it's

a little different from the last one because he was actually
present when the field test was conducted.

But we don't

have the person here who actually conducted the field test.
Urn -- I just think that at some point that we have to say
this is not sufficient, we have to do more.

And so I would
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argue'against the sufficiency of the evidence for bind over
on that basis.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Urn -- this is an officer

that was present at the time, was just outside the door, had
seen the location, had seen everything that was involved in
it, and was involved with running the whole search, and was
advised by other officers what had been found in areas that
he had seen himself as well.
THE COURT:

I'm troubled.

Why -- Why haven't you

brought in the officer who made the find?
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

In the interest of judicial

economy, judge, I wanted to have the officer who made the
decisions about why and when to make this search.

If the --

if it would please the court and Mr. Gale, I'm happy to move
to continue the prelim and get those officers in.
THE COURT:

Anything further?

MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN:

Nothing further from the

state.
MR. GALE:
preliminary hearing.
THE COURT:

Judge, I think today is the day set for
Urn -I'm not going to move the prelim.

That was a bad choice, counsel.
can be established on hearsay.
the last hearing.

You know, probable cause
And I was stretching it at

But this one -- all I've got is the

officer's received report from someone who said that someone
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was buying from the defendant.
didn't find anything himself.

He went to the location,
He stepped outside, and then

I have a report that an officer found some drugs.

I don't

have any direct testimony that the drugs were located.
- this one falls short.

Urn -

Urn -- I'm going to find that you

failed to meet your burden of proof now.
- the burden for re-filing.

I understand the -

Mr. Gale does as well.

Whether

or not you legitimately or reasonably underestimated the
proof that would be necessary for today is not before me.
But you didn't meet your burden.
ending in 2004.

So ten is dismissed.

Case

Now, do you want to enter a plea in the

case ending in 3429?
MR. GALE:

Judge, could we come back to enter a

plea?
THE COURT:

Yes.

We will catch -- set the case

for entry of plea -- urn -- September -- when -- September 18
at 1:30.
MR. GALE:

Okay.
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